Summary

Integration in sight?

A review of eight domains of integration of migrants in the Netherlands

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Summary

Trends in integration; conclusions

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This in-depth study of integration aims to provide an insight into trends in the integration of non-Western migrant groups in the Netherlands. We concentrate mainly on first and second-generation migrants of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean origin – the four largest non-Western migrant groups in the Netherlands. We investigate whether the differences between the position of these groups in society and the native Dutch population are increasing or decreasing. We draw a distinction here between structural and socio-cultural positions (Dagevos 2001; Huijnk et al. 2015). Structural positions refer to various domains of the social stratification, such as education, work, income and housing. Socio-cultural position can be subdivided into an emotional/affective component (e.g. identification), a social component (e.g. interethnic contacts) and a cultural component (e.g. opinions) (see e.g. Huijnk et al. 2015). We apply proportionality as a criterion for assessing structural position: do members of migrant groups occupy the same position in society as Dutch natives with the same characteristics? With regard to unemployment, for example, we make allowance for differences in education level and work experience; proportionality can then be said to exist if migrants are just as often unemployed as Dutch natives with a comparable education and work experience.
In this chapter we draw some conclusions. We do this by summarising the main findings, culminating in a view on the current status of integration.

Disadvantage in primary education declining; proportionality being achieved

The performance of non-Western primary school pupils in reading comprehension and arithmetic is improving. The wide gap between non-Western pupils and their native Dutch peers is gradually narrowing and can be attributed to differences in background characteristics, especially the education level of the parents. In arithmetic, pupils of Turkish and Moroccan origin, and those in the category 'other non-Western pupils', actually perform better than might be expected based on their characteristics.
Trends in the performance in the 'Cito-tests' set by the National Institute for Educational Measurement (CITO) show that pupils from the four largest non-Western migrant groups are catching up; the marks achieved by native Dutch pupils in the Cito-tests have been stable for years, whereas those of migrant pupils show an upward trend.
Primary school pupils of Moroccan background show the biggest improvement, their performance in language and arithmetic has improved steadily over recent years, and their Cito-test results now differ little from those of pupils of Surinamese origin.

Secondary education level of non-Western migrants rising; proportionality being achieved here, too

The picture of disadvantage and progress is also observed in secondary education. Students with a non-Western background are still substantially represented in the lower tracks of pre-vocational secondary education (vmbo) and practical training than native Dutch students.

Figure S.1

Distribution across education levels in the third year of secondary education, by origin, 2015/16[a] (in percentages)



- praktijkonderwijs: practical training
- vmbo basis: pre-vocational secondary education (basic vocational track)
- vmbo kader: pre-vocational secondary education (advanced vocational track)
- vmbo g: pre-vocational secondary education (combined vocational-theoretical track)
- vmbo t: pre-vocational secondary education (theoretical track)
- havo: senior general secondary education
- havo/vwo: senior general secondary/pre-university education
- vwo: pre-university education

a Provisional figures.

Source: CBS (StatLine)

The average education level of students of Moroccan, Surinamese and – to a lesser extent – Turkish origin did however improve over the period studied (2007/08-2015/'6), somewhat narrowing the gap between these groups and native Dutch students. The lower education level of students of Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese origin can be traced back almost entirely to family characteristics, especially lower parental education level. It is less easy to ascribe the gap between natives and students of Antillean origin to characteristics of their parents. Finally, other non-Western students follow higher tracks of secondary education than might be expected based on the education level of their parents.

As in primary education, then, non-Western secondary school students still lag a considerable distance behind their native Dutch peers, but are gradually making up ground, and the disadvantage can be ascribed to differences in characteristics between students, especially the home milieu. Here again, therefore, there is evidence of proportionality. These findings allow the tentative conclusion to be drawn that educating children from migrant groups produces the same 'returns' as educating Dutch native children from the same socio-economic milieus. Given that the socioeconomic milieu changes only very gradually, this means that improving the educational achievements of migrant children further will be a lengthy process.

Reduction in school dropout, but still high in senior secondary vocational education

The rate of premature dropout from secondary schools is falling, among both Dutch natives and migrant students (see Figure S.2). This is also true in senior secondary vocational education (mbo), though here students with a non-Western background still drop out much more often than native Dutch (see Figure S.3).

Falling graduation rates from universities of applied science

The proportion of the various groups of non-Western migrants progressing to further and higher education is high. While there was a reduction in the number of senior secondary vocational (mbo) students going on to universities of applied science (hbo) – a route that is important for non-Western migrants – the number following this route is still higher than among native Dutch mbo students. The results attained by university of applied science students of non-Western origin have deteriorated, with a reduction in the percentage graduating within five years. This also applied for native Dutch students over the period studied, but the decline was less steep. The results attained by students of non-Western origin at university, by contrast, improved, though here again they have not yet closed the gap on native Dutch students.

Figure S.2

Premature dropout[a] from secondary school, by origin, 2004/05-2014/15 (in percentages)



a Students aged up to and including 22 years.

Source: CBS (StatLine)

Education level of migrant groups rising

As illustrated above, the statistics on the educational achievement of young members of migrant groups show a predominantly positive trend. This trend has been under way for some time, and is translating into a rise in the education level attained by the four largest non-Western migrant groups, as well as by other non-Western migrants. The proportion with a low education level – attaining no more than primary education – is declining, though it still affects roughly one in three migrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin aged between 15 and 64 years (compared with 6% of the native Dutch population). The second generation is substantially better educated than the first. Second-generation members of the Turkish and Moroccan communities are just as well educated as Dutch natives with comparable characteristics, and whilst members of the second generation of Surinamese and Antillean origin are slightly less well educated than Dutch natives with comparable characteristics, the differences are small.

Figure S.3

Premature dropout[a] from senior secondary vocational education[b], by origin, 2004/05-2014/15 (in percentages)



a Students aged up to and including 22 years.

b Excluding external students.

Source: CBS (StatLine)

Better command of Dutch language

Statistics covering a period of more than 25 years show a steady improvement in the command of the Dutch language among those of Turkish and Moroccan origin, narrowing the differences between the four groups studied on this point. Of these migrant groups, those of Turkish origin most often have difficulty with the Dutch language. They also least often speak Dutch in their home setting: 31% of people of Turkish origin never speak Dutch with their partner, and 16% never do so with their children. Those of Moroccan origin have fewer problems with Dutch and more often use it in the domestic setting. Virtually no migrants of Surinamese or Antillean origin report problems with Dutch; the vast majority use Dutch at home when speaking to their partners and children.

Work and income: persistently wide gap

Given the rising education level and steadily improving command of Dutch in the four largest non-Western migrant groups, it would be logical to expect to see a clear improvement in their position on the labour market, especially as a growing proportion of these groups are members of the second generation. Despite this, in the period studied (2003-2015) we see no narrowing of the gap: access to (permanent) work remains a key stumbling block, with unemployment, including youth unemployment, almost three times as high as in the native Dutch population. The share of working people in the population – the net partici-

pation rate – shows a comparable picture, with no discernible sign of non-Western migrant groups catching up between 2003 and 2015. Developments since 2003 show that the migrant unemployment rate is heavily influenced by the economic climate: when this is weak, unemployment rises rapidly and the gap relative to Dutch natives widens. This reveals how vulnerable the labour market position of many migrants and their children is. When the economy picks up, the unemployment gap narrows.
A further point of concern is that proportionality on the labour market is a long way off, particularly among young people and members of the second generation. Less than half the unemployment gap between second-generation migrants and Dutch natives can be explained by characteristics such as education level and average age (see Figure S.4 for the findings of an analysis of the second generation). The remaining (unexplained) difference is associated among other things with discrimination, which research has shown to have a negative impact on the opportunities of migrant groups in the Netherlands (Andriessen et al. 2012, 2015; Blommaert & Coenders 2014). Other factors may also play a role here, such as less efficient jobseeking behaviour, a weaker focus on the jobs market, the higher proportion of young men in the crime suspect statistics, and a lack of functional networks for the labour market.

Figure S.4
Actual and adjusted difference in unemployment in second generation, by origin, 2015 (in percentage points)



Source: CBS (EBB'15)

Employers have more choice in times of economic weakness, and a person's origin then counts for more. It is less clear whether, as well as economic fluctuations, there is a structural trend towards more proportionate positions on the labour market. With some caution, it may be concluded that the unemployment gap is narrowing for migrant groups as a

whole after correcting for differences in characteristics. On the other hand, the job opportunities for members of the second generation appear to have deteriorated.

The weak labour market position of migrants is also reflected in the high proportion of flexible jobs in this group (37% versus 24% among Dutch natives). These figures have jumped sharply since the start of the century for both migrants and Dutch natives. A permanent job is now a rarity for all young people (15-24 years): 76% of young migrants are in flexible employment, compared with 67% of their native Dutch peers. There was no significant change in the gap between these groups between 2003 and 2015.
The labour market disadvantage of migrant groups relative to Dutch natives is also reflected in their income: incomes of Dutch natives increased more rapidly between 2001 and 2014 than they did among non-Western migrants, and the income differentials have accordingly widened somewhat.

Positive labour market developments: increased participation of women of Turkish and Moroccan origin and growing migrant middle class

During the period studied (2003 - 2015), the net participation rate of women, in particular, increased – rising by 6 percentage points among women of Turkish and Moroccan origin, for example. The occupational level of working migrants is also rising. Although migrants with a Turkish and Moroccan background are still often in low-skilled work, the migrant middle class has grown steadily over recent decades due to rising education levels and the expanding second generation.

Nonetheless, the overall picture for the labour market is still a predominantly bleak one, dominated by the difficulty of accessing (permanent) work. Unemployment is high and the labour participation rate of migrant groups has not improved relative to Dutch natives. Income differentials are considerable and have widened slightly over the last decade. The proportionate labour market participation that is the goal of Dutch integration policy is still a long way from being achieved.

Rising home ownership

Home ownership has grown faster among non-Western migrants since the start of this century (from 24% to 39%) than among Dutch natives (from 64% to 70%). This means that Dutch natives own their home almost twice as often as non-Western migrants. The recent crisis years did not however lead to a levelling off of the increase in home ownership among non-Western migrants. Migrants of Turkish origin stand out here, with home ownership doubling from 23% to 46%. This means that, along with migrants of Surinamese origin, members of this group most often own their own home. Home ownership has also doubled among migrants of Moroccan origin (from 10% to 19%), though that is still a low figure compared with the other groups. People of Moroccan origin also often live in the smallest homes, having the lowest number of rooms per person of all groups. Not surprisingly, therefore, they are the least satisfied with their homes. Non-Western migrants in

general live in smaller homes than Dutch natives. Only 1% of Dutch natives live in a home with an average of less than one room per person; this applies for 14% of non-Western migrants, and they moreover have a small living room more than twice as often (11% versus 27%). Despite this, the majority (70%) are satisfied or very satisfied with their home. With the exception of those of Surinamese origin, members of the second generation in all groups more often own their own home than members of the first generation. There is a greater degree of proportionality in the second generation than in the first generation. Moreover, the degree of proportionality is lowest among migrants of Antillean origin, and especially among those of Moroccan origin, and this lack of proportionality appears to be increasing rather than decreasing over time.

More and more neighbourhoods with more than 50% non-Western migrants

The share of non-Western migrants in the total Dutch population is growing steadily. As an example, the proportion of municipalities with between 10% and 25% non-Western migrants doubled between 2002 and 2015. The number of postcode areas where more than half the population is of non-Western origin rose from 35 in 2002 to 51 in 2015. However, the number reached 53 in 2009 and 2012, which means the (numerical) increase has not continued. Growth appears to be slackening in the major cities but increasing in the peripheral municipalities. This is also reflected in the opportunities for meeting Dutch natives, which have remained stable over recent years in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht.

Falling suspect rates, but percentage of suspects and recidivism still high

Members of migrant groups are still heavily overrepresented in the crime suspect statistics, though the long-standing decline in the percentage of suspects within migrant groups is continuing (see Figure S.5). The difference relative to Dutch natives has reduced in absolute terms.

Despite falling suspect rates, the picture is not a positive one. The percentage of suspects among non-Western migrants is still roughly four times as high as among Dutch natives; that was the case in 2000 and was still the case in 2014. In 2014, 2.7% of non-Western migrants were suspected of having committed a crime, compared with 0.7% of Dutch natives. There are however wide differences between individual migrant groups. Members of the Antillean and Moroccan groups are most often suspected of committing an offence (4.7% and 3.9%, respectively). The crime figures are lowest among those of Turkish and other non-Western origin (2.2% and 1.9%, respectively), but are still almost three times as high as in the native Dutch population.

Figure S.5

Suspects, by origin, 2000-2014[a] (in percentages)



a The figures for 2014 are provisional and generally give a slight underestimate of the actual number of suspects.

Source: CBS (HKS'00-'14)

Suspects from migrant groups are usually young men (see Table S.6). Young men of Antillean and Moroccan origin lead the field here, with 15.3% of Moroccan-origin migrants aged 18 to 24 years being suspects, and 9.8% of those of Antillean origin. Young persons of Turkish and Surinamese origin are also suspected of crimes more often than Dutch natives in the same age group (2.8%).

Table S.6

Suspects, by origin, age and gender, 2014 (in percentages)

	men				women			
	12-17	18-24	25-44	≥ 45	12-17	18-24	25-44	≥ 45
native Dutch	1.0	2.8	1.6	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.4	0.2
Turkish	3.2	6.9	4.2	1.8	0.4	0.9	0.5	0.3
Moroccan	6.6	15.3	7.0	1.6	1.0	2.2	1.1	0.4
Surinamese	4.1	8.0	6.3	2.8	0.9	2.1	1.5	0.7
Antillean	5.9	9.8	8.4	4.8	2.0	2.9	2.4	0.9
other non-Western	2.9	5.5	3.2	1.7	0.6	1.0	0.7	0.5
total non-Western	4.2	8.3	5.0	2.2	0.8	1.5	1.0	0.5

Source: CBS (HKS'14)

Recidivism is also highest among migrants of Moroccan and Antillean origin: 39% and 38%, respectively, are crime suspects again within six years, compared with 22% among Dutch natives. The suspect and recidivism rates are lowest among members of the Turkish-origin community and the category 'other non-Western migrants'.
Young people who were aged 12 in 1996 were studied over a period of 18 years (i.e. until age 30) to see whether they were classified as a suspect at least once during that time. This was the case for no fewer than 70% of men of Moroccan origin and for over half of men of Turkish, Surinamese and Antillean origin. The figure among native Dutch men was 28%.
If allowance is made for differences in socioeconomic (e.g. work, benefits, income), demographic (e.g. age, sex, partner, children) and geographical factors (e.g. urbanicity of the residential environment), it transpires that Turkish and other non-Western migrants barely differ from Dutch natives with the same characteristics. The fact that they are more often suspects is thus attributable to differences in those characteristics. There is thus proportionality in these groups. That is not the case for those of Antillean, Moroccan and Surinamese origin, which suggests that, possibly specifically ethnocultural factors, could play a role. Those factors do however appear to have become less important over the last ten years: analyses show that differences in suspect rates can increasingly be explained by general socioeconomic and demographic factors. This is also borne out by an analysis of the second generation, where we can explain differences in suspect rates better than in the past using general factors. Proportionality is thus coming closer. On the other hand, it is more difficult to explain differences in suspect rates for the second generation and for young persons using general socioeconomic and demographic factors. The neighbourhood has virtually no influence on these differences, which means that other factors play a key role. The literature refers to group-specific explanations, such as generational and acculturation conflicts within the family and differences in social control of young people within the different migrant groups. Given the (often) contradictory views and street codes, the home situation and the 'civic society' (e.g. school and work), young people have to construct their personal identity. This can lead to conflicts and problem behaviour (Jennissen 2009; Pels 2008). Ethnic profiling by the police may also mean that members of certain groups are more likely to be caught (Landman & Kleijer-Kool 2016).

Hybrid identification and social networks. Focus on own ethnic group remains strong among those of Turkish and Moroccan origin

Young persons of Turkish and Moroccan origin and members of the second generation identify strongly with their ethnic group and often spend their leisure time with members of their own group. At the same time, a substantial proportion of them also identify with the Netherlands and also have Dutch natives in their social networks, although they still seem to turn predominantly to members of their own ethnic group for more personal contacts. Many young and second-generation migrants of Moroccan and Turkish origin thus adopt a multiple identification and a diverse circle of friends and acquaintances, whilst retaining a strong focus on their own ethnic group. First-generation migrants of Turkish

and Moroccan origin often adopt a more one-sided identification and have a circle of friends and acquaintances that is dominated by members of their own group. A strong identification with the Netherlands occurs mainly among those of Surinamese and Antillean origin, and the same applies for a mixed or predominantly Dutch native circle of friends and acquaintances.
With some caveats – the trend data show wide fluctuations – it can be tentatively concluded that the number of persons of Turkish or Moroccan origin who predominantly feel members of their own ethnic group has reduced since the start of this century. This downward trend is also observed among those of Surinamese and Antillean origin. Data on the ethnic composition of social networks do not always point in the same direction; some findings in this report show that little has changed over the last 15 to 20 years, while others suggest an increase in contacts between members of migrant groups and Dutch natives. It appears that the share of second-generation migrants who never have contact with Dutch natives is greater than 20 years ago, whereas in the first generation the reverse is true.
The number of marriages between migrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin and native Dutch partners is below 10%, a figure that has barely changed in the last 15 years.
Contacts between members of migrant groups and Dutch natives are influenced by both promoting factors (rising education level, growing second generation) and inhibiting factors (percentage of migrants in the neighbourhood). Preferences are also important: migrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin have a certain preference for contact with members of their own group, and this influences the ethnic composition of their circle of friends and acquaintances. Conversely, this factor will also play a role among Dutch natives, who have relatively little contact with members of migrant groups (40% never have contact, only 8% have frequent contact).
Some caution is thus called for, but generally speaking these indicators suggest that little has changed over the last 20 years in the extent of contacts between persons of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillean origin and Dutch natives.

Increasingly modern views on gender roles; wide differences in acceptance of homosexuality

There are considerable differences between the groups in their views on the position of women and their attitudes to homosexuality. Persons of Turkish and Moroccan origin hold the most traditional views on these topics. Members of the second generation hold more positive attitudes towards homosexuality than the first generation, but take the same view on the position of women. People of Turkish and Moroccan origin consider homosexuality problematic mainly when it is close to home (if their own child is homosexual) and is accompanied by equal rights to marry. The differences compared to Dutch natives are then substantial. Acceptance of homosexuality has increased slightly over the last four years in the migrant groups studied here, and this also applies for the second generation. The differences in views on acceptance of homosexuality between (second-generation) migrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin and other groups remain wide, however. At the same time,

views on gender roles among people of Turkish and Moroccan origin have become more modern on average over the last 25 years.

Social participation lower in migrant groups than among Dutch natives.

Broadly speaking, the social and political participation of non-Western migrants is lower than that of Dutch natives. Migrants are less often members of associations, less often do voluntary work, provide less informal help and less often vote. The social participation of members of the second generation is higher than in the first generation.

The lower level of volunteering can be explained to some extent (roughly a third) by various background characteristics of migrant groups. For example, migrants are generally less well educated, and it is known that people with a lower education level less often volunteer. Most of the difference found between Dutch natives and non-Western migrants and their progeny remains unexplained, however, suggesting that different factors are at work. Migrants are less often members of associations, and such membership is often the first step towards volunteering. A poor command of the Dutch language can also form an additional barrier. The way in which associations go in search of new volunteers may also have an influence.

Members of the four migrant groups studied generally have substantially less trust in other people than Dutch natives do (see Table S.7), and also have less trust in the police (around 60% versus 71%). Trust in the legal system is relatively high, with little variation across the groups. Trust in the government is low, and here again the differences between the groups are small.

Table S.7

Social and institutional trust, by origin, persons aged 15 years and older, 2015 (in percentages)

	Turkish	Moroccan	Surinamese	Antillean	native Dutch
social trust[a]	35	44	37	39	64
trust in the police (% > 6)[b]	57	60	60	60	71
trust in the legal system (% > 6)[b]	73	78	68	68	75
trust in the Dutch government (% > 6)[b]	41	46	45	44	47

a Respondents were asked: 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted?' The response categories were: (0) 'You can't be too careful' and (1) 'Can be trusted'.

b Respondents were asked: 'How much do you currently trust the police, the legal system, the Dutch government?' The response categories ranged from (1) 'no trust at all' to (10) 'a great deal of trust'. The response categories 6 to 10 inclusive were merged to form a single category: 'Sufficient trust'.

Source: SCP (SIM'15)

Young members of migrant groups and members of the second generation less often trust the police than older people and members of the first generation. This applies in particular

for young and second-generation Moroccan migrants, probably because of their frequently reported negative experiences with the police. A high education level often goes hand in hand with trust, but we do not find this link for trust in the government and the police among migrants of Moroccan origin.

Migrants consistently more negative about social climate

Members of migrant groups have generally become less positive about opportunities and life in the Netherlands over the last decade (figures for the period 2006-2015). Only 60% of people of Turkish, Moroccan and Antillean origin feel at home in the Netherlands, and that figure reduced between 2006 and 2015. More people of Surinamese origin (72%) feel at home, but once again this figure is lower than in 2006. Members of the second generation, who were by definition born in the Netherlands, do not feel at home here any more often – if anything, the reverse is true, with the exception of second-generation migrants of Antillean origin, who more often feel at home in the Netherlands than the first generation.
We find broadly the same picture for migrants' views on the prevalence of discrimination and their assessment of equality of opportunity and acceptance of migrant groups in the Netherlands. Young people and members of the second generation, in particular, have become more negative in their views on these topics over the last decade – once again with the exception of second-generation Antillean migrants.
These negative views are also reflected in the desire to emigrate: 43% of those of Turkish origin would like to settle in Turkey permanently, a higher percentage than among those of Moroccan (17%), Surinamese (24%) and Antillean (30%) origin. The share of second-generation migrants of Turkish origin who would like to live permanently in Turkey has risen particularly over the last ten years. This is likely to be related to their increasing dissatisfaction with life in the Netherlands and how they are perceived as a group, but also with the growing appeal of Turkey, which is playing an ever more prominent political and economic role on the world stage. Unlike migrants, more Dutch natives than in 2006 believe that the Netherlands is an open and equitable country. By contrast, migrants have become more negative on this point.

Based on portrayals in the media and shifts in the political landscape, it seems likely that the resistance to migrants in the Netherlands will only increase, though the picture presented by the statistics is more nuanced. The percentage of Dutch natives who believe that there are too many different nationalities living in the Netherlands has fallen steadily since the turn of the millennium. A large proportion (70%) – although slightly smaller than in 2006 – think it is a good thing that a society should be made up of different cultures.
Although the public debate sometimes suggests otherwise, Dutch natives are not bent on increasing the social distance to migrants (but are also not intent on reducing it), and attitudes to migrants are not becoming more negative.
Although the picture is less polarised than is sometimes suggested, therefore, both migrants and – especially – Dutch natives do experience interethnic tensions in the Netherlands. Additionally, around 30% of both Dutch natives and migrants believe that these ten-

sions will definitely increase. We can relate the tensions among Dutch natives to perceived cultural threat and concerns about sociocultural changes in the Netherlands. Among migrants, the tension is related to experiences of discrimination: the more migrants feel excluded, the more tension they experience. This can cause migrants to withdraw into their own ethnic or religious group, reinforcing the symbolic boundaries and their external manifestations. This in turn strengthens the cultural plurality, which can lead to an increase in the perceived cultural threat among Dutch natives. These processes can therefore result in (even) more polarisation.

Group profiles

Thus far, the findings have been presented by topic; we will now present them by migrant group.

Moroccan group

There are 389,000 residents of the Netherlands with Moroccan origin. The way this group is perceived is not positive: on a scale from 0-100, where higher numbers indicate more positive feelings, Dutch natives awarded an average score of 45 for people of Moroccan origin, compared with 63 for people of Surinamese origin, 57 for those of Turkish origin and 53 for people of Antillean origin, making this the lowest score. This low score is probably linked to the association between migrants of Moroccan origin and high crime rates. Young adult males of Moroccan origin, in particular, are often recorded as suspects (see Table S.6), and also have high recidivism rates. Crime rates among people of Moroccan origin are highest around the age of 20, after which they rapidly decline. The share of migrants of Moroccan origin in the suspect statistics has in fact been falling since 2005. Despite this, they account for a bigger share of the statistics than Dutch natives with the same characteristics. There is thus no proportionality here.

Members of the Moroccan community have the worst labour market position among the four largest non-Western groups. The percentage in work is the lowest, both for the group as a whole and for women – though the number of women in work did increase substantially between 2003 and 2015, especially among members of the second generation.

This weak labour market position translates into lower incomes and extensive poverty; few people of Moroccan origin own their own home and many live in inadequate housing. The high (youth) unemployment can be explained only partially by differences in factors such as education level and work experience; members of the Moroccan community with the same labour market qualifications as Dutch natives are much more often unemployed. As regards access to work, therefore, proportionality is still a long way off. At the same time, there has been a steady increase over the last decade in the share of Moroccan migrants with jobs at a high occupational level. This is largely the result of their increased education level, especially those in the second generation.

A number of positive trends are occurring in primary education, with pupils of Moroccan origin currently performing the best out of all the non-Western groups in arithmetic, while

their achievements in language learning have also improved. This is leading to a steady improvement in the Cito-test results, which now differ only slightly from those of pupils of Surinamese origin. Despite these improvements, however, pupils of Moroccan origin are still heavily represented in the lower tracks of vocational education. Among those who are no longer in education, the percentage with a lower education level (no higher than primary education) is still considerable, though it has more than halved in 20 years, from almost 85% to less than 40%.
The relative increase in the number of the second-generation of Moroccan migrants, coupled with their rising education level, has led to a substantial improvement in their command of the Dutch language over the last 20 years. They have fewer problems with Dutch than persons of Turkish origin and more often use it in the domestic setting.
Their views on the position of women have gradually become more modern over recent years. However, many people of Moroccan origin are reluctant to accept homosexuality, especially within their own family.
Around 80% of migrants of Moroccan origin feel Moroccan; around half combine this with a strong identification with the Netherlands. The attachment to their own ethnic group is still very strong in the second generation, with almost three-quarters feeling strongly Moroccan. They are thus oriented towards their own ethnic group, but also towards the Netherlands. We find the same thing for social contacts, which are often with other people of Moroccan origin, but also frequently with Dutch natives. All this has not resulted in high satisfaction levels among second-generation Moroccans with their lives in the Netherlands. In fact, their views on this are fairly negative. Like the other groups, migrants of Moroccan origin are experiencing more and more discrimination, with only a small proportion of the second generation saying they have never experienced discrimination.
They also perceive great tensions between different population groups in the Netherlands. Second-generation Moroccan migrants also have relatively little trust in the Dutch government, and almost half this generation have little trust in the police. The disaffection is considerable, therefore, especially among younger members of the group and the second generation.

Turkish group

At almost 400,000, the population of Turkish origin is the largest non-Western group in the Netherlands. Over the past year, they have dominated the news more than in the past. In the period after the attempted coup in Turkey, for example, Turks living in the Netherlands held frequent public demonstrations. The strong ties felt by many numbers of the Dutch Turkish community to Turkey and the Turkish identity came as a surprise to many onlookers. In fact, however, these ties to their country of origin are nothing new; earlier SCP integration reports have repeatedly told the same story. The most recent figures in this report show that around 80% of people of Turkish origin feel strongly or very strongly Turkish. In addition, 41% feel strongly or very strongly Dutch, while over a quarter do not feel Dutch (at all). The focus on Turkey is still very strong among members of the second generation, though they more often combine this with a strong identification with the Netherlands.

Despite the predominantly strong identification as Turkish, there are still very marked internal differences between people of Turkish origin, along religious (e.g. Sunni - Alawite), political (e.g. nationalist/religious and secular) and ethnic lines (e.g. ethnic Turkish - Kurdish). Social contacts are often concentrated within the Turkish group and there are few marriages (less than 10%) with Dutch natives. Compared with the other migrant groups in this report, members of the Turkish community least often feel at home in the Netherlands. They are also pessimistic about the social climate towards migrant groups and perceive tensions between different sections of the population. No fewer than 43% would like to live in Turkey. This holds for a third of the second generation – a much higher proportion than in the second generation of other migrant groups.
There also appears to be a relationship between the internal orientation and strong social ties within the Turkish group and the fact that they are the least strongly represented in the crime figures of the migrant groups studied here. They still differ markedly from Dutch natives, but that is largely attributable to general factors such as the socioeconomic composition of the household. In this regard, the Turkish community are approaching proportionality. Their recidivism rates are also favourable compared with other migrant groups.
Over the last 25 years, the command of the Dutch language in the Turkish group has improved steadily, though members of this group still struggle with Dutch more often than the other migrant groups studied here. They also least often speak Dutch in their home setting: Although the use of Dutch at home is increasing, progress is slower than in the Moroccan group, and also at a lower level.
Pupils of Turkish origin are making progress in education, but generally more slowly than their Moroccan-origin counterparts. The performance of pupils of Turkish origin in reading comprehension is the worst of the migrant groups studied here, probably due in part to the internal orientation of their community. If we correct for differences in characteristics, pupils of Turkish origin perform just as well as native Dutch pupils in reading and arithmetic. Proportionality has therefore been achieved here; the parental education level is of particular importance on this point. In secondary education, students of Turkish origin are in senior general secondary or pre-university education the least often of the four large non-Western groups, and have the lowest chance of success at almost all levels.
Members of the Turkish group lag a long way behind Dutch natives on the labour market, though their unemployment rate is lower than among those of Moroccan and Antillean origin. As with the other migrant groups, there is no proportionality in unemployment: the same characteristics do not result in the same chance of work. The net participation rate of women of Turkish origin has increased over the last 15 years. As well as the high unemployment, there is also a growing middle class, as more and more members of the Turkish community find work at a high occupational level.
On the housing market, the sharp rise in home ownership is striking. At the same time, the reason that people of Turkish origin live in neighbourhoods with a relatively high migrant population is hard to explain based on general personal and housing market characteristics. They appear to have a strong preference for living in neighbourhoods with other members of their own group.

Surinamese group

There are 350,000 residents of the Netherlands with a Surinamese background. On many fronts, they are in the best position of the four largest non-Western groups, as reflected for example in their results in the Cito national school tests and their performance in reading comprehension at primary school, the share of people in work and their position on the housing market (the highest number of owner-occupiers, large homes and the most satisfied with their home). Of the four migrant groups studied, people of Surinamese origin least often have problems with the Dutch language; almost all of them speak Dutch at home with their partner and children. Many feel mainly Dutch and have a mixed circle of friends and acquaintances which includes both members of their own ethnic group and Dutch natives, as well as others. Around 30% of marriages are to a native Dutch partner. Seen from this perspective, many members of the Surinamese community are rooted in the Netherlands. However, not all the developments are equally positive. The share of the community in employment shrank by no less than 8 percentage points between 2003 and 2015. They are also fairly strongly represented in the crime suspect statistics – to a lesser extent than those of Antillean and Moroccan origin, but more so than those of Turkish origin. The number of suspects moreover remains relatively high after the age of 20.
There is also some discontent and concern among the Surinamese community. This is most visible in the changes in their views on discrimination in the Netherlands: where in 2006 15% of people of Surinamese origin felt that ethnic minorities were often or very often subject to discrimination by Dutch natives, that figure had almost trebled to 41% in 2015. Personal experiences of discrimination are also increasing. This may reflect the heightened debate in the Netherlands about discrimination, racism and stereotypical views, with the discussion surrounding the folklore figure of *Zwarte Piet* ('Black Pete') perhaps the most pertinent example.

Antillean group

At just over 150,000, the population of Antillean origin is the smallest non-Western community in the Netherlands. They are a highly diverse group. Many people of Antillean origin are doing well, including many members of the second generation. By contrast, many members of the first generation, who have moved to the Netherlands over roughly the last 20 years, and their children, are doing much less well. Their achievements at primary school are worrying, with particularly low scores in arithmetic tests and the national Cito-test. Primary school pupils of Antillean origin do the least well off the four groups studied here. The divided nature of the Antillean group is clearly visible in secondary education: a high proportion of students follow practical training (the lowest track of pre-vocational secondary education), whilst at the same time a large proportion are in senior general secondary or pre-university education, where they moreover have a greater chance of success than students from the other non-Western groups. One positive trend is the sharp fall in school dropout in the Antillean group. The picture on the labour market is also divided: high unemployment and wide-ranging poverty set against high incomes and a high pro-

portion of people in work. The share of the Antillean community working at the highest occupational level is close to that in the native Dutch population.
Members of the Antillean community are the most strongly represented in the crime suspect statistics of the four migrant groups, and this applies especially for young men. Unlike people of Moroccan origin, the number of suspects declines less quickly after the age of 20: a substantial proportion of 'older' members of the Antillean group are crime suspects. Women of Antillean origin are also relatively often suspects. Recidivism is high in the Antillean group, and is at the same level as in the Moroccan community.
Most members of the Antillean community have no difficulties with the Dutch language and speak it with their children. The majority of those with Antillean roots feel both strongly or very strongly Dutch (62%) and strongly or very strongly Antillean (57%). There is also a sizeable group who do not feel Antillean. A considerable proportion of the first generation still feel strong ties to their country of origin; that is much less the case among members of the second generation. The social distance to the native Dutch population is small; many people of Antillean origin have very frequent contacts with Dutch natives, and 45% of marriages each year are to a Dutch native. Nonetheless, there appears to be a slight downward trend in the percentage who have frequent contact with Dutch natives. The perception of people of Antillean origin is not a positive one, and a high proportion experience discrimination, just as we saw with those of Surinamese origin. This may be linked to the fierce debate that has raged in the Netherlands in recent years on racism and stereotypical views, with the most visible being the discussion surrounding *Zwarte Piet* referred to above.

Conclusions: better resources, but unequal opportunities and more disaffection

This report on integration describes a picture full of tensions. On the one hand, the education level of the migrant groups studied is rising and their educational achievement and command of the Dutch language are improving. On the other hand, they are still at a great disadvantage on the labour market and are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with their lives and opportunities in the Netherlands. They are also still heavily overrepresented in the crime figures, despite falling suspect rates in all groups. The expectation that generational succession would bring progress in this regard has been only partially fulfilled. The second generation is the driver of the increased education level and improved command of the Dutch language, but equality of opportunity on the labour market has not increased substantially over the last ten years. Or, to couch it in the terms of this report: proportionality with regard to unemployment has not come closer in the second generation over the last ten years. Better resources in the form of command of the Dutch language and higher education levels are evidently not enough. This is linked among other things to discrimination. Moreover, the picture painted by Dutch research is incomplete. For example, we know too little about differences in job application skills and the work ethic between different population groups, or the importance of networks. All in all, we may conclude that there is a wide gulf between (young) migrants and paid employment. From the perspective of integration policy, it is disappointing that so little progress has been made in recent years.

More positive is the steady rise in the occupational level of migrants, leading to an emergent middle class.

The increase in the relative size of the second generation has also not led to a reduction in the dissatisfaction with the social climate in the Netherlands. On the contrary: it is precisely young people and members of the second generation who are concerned about their own chances and those of other members of migrant groups. This is sometimes referred to as the integration paradox. There is a link here to their sociocultural position. This report shows that young people with a Turkish and Moroccan background are rooted in their own ethnic group and also have ties with and an affinity for the Netherlands and Dutch natives. The study 'Worlds of difference' (*Werelden van verschil*) (Huijnk et al. 2015) showed how this impacts on the way young people perceive their lives in the Netherlands. Their own ethnic and religious background serves as an important frame of reference with which they judge events in the Netherlands. There is a widely felt sense that double standards are applied, in which migrants or Muslims are judged more negatively than others. This gives many young people a strong feeling of being excluded. They do not feel they are seen as citizens of the Netherlands, but rather as members of an ethnic and religious group which does not belong. At the same time, many young people do want to be part of Dutch society. Despite their strong orientation towards their own group, they are living their lives in the Netherlands and are focused on the host country to a greater or lesser extent. This adds an extra twist to the feeling of being excluded and not belonging, and contributes to their disaffection with the position of migrant groups and with their own position in Dutch society.

Access to more resources does not therefore automatically lead to fewer integration problems. There is an important challenge here for integration policy. The most important question that needs to be addressed is how the increased human capital can be converted into a more 'inclusive' society, with better opportunities on the labour market and more (young) migrants who feel an attachment to Dutch society.

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